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REVOLUTION V. EVOLUTION IN CLASS 
ACTION REFORM* 
RICHARD MARCUS** 
It is widely agreed that the federal-court class action became a 
somewhat revolutionary device after Rule 23 was amended in 
1966. Since 1966, further substantial changes to the rule have 
been considered by the rulemakers, but more proposals have 
been discarded than adopted. Meanwhile, a major battle has 
emerged about whether class actions should primarily or solely 
be designed to achieve deterrence or limited to a compensatory 
function. That division has been central to many current debates, 
such as the issue of “no injury” class actions, whether courts 
could certify classes only after determining that they were 
“ascertainable” by an identified administratively feasible method, 
and whether the idea of cy pres could be used to justify class 
actions in which the defendant paid a large amount, but the class 
members themselves received little or nothing and the funds were 
instead used for good works of some relevant sort. 
Changes to Rule 23 in the last half century have not directly 
addressed these hot-button issues. But judicial decisions—
including some by the Supreme Court—have tackled some of 
these issues, and Congress has adopted legislation to address 
some alleged class action abuses, such as “coupon settlements.” 
 
 *  © 2018 Richard Marcus. 
 **  Coil Chair in Litigation, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I 
am indebted to Steve Burbank, Scott Dodson, and Mary Kay Kane for comments on a 
draft. I did not accept all their suggestions. 
  Since 1996, I have served as Associate Reporter of the Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules. In that role, I was present for the end of the first episode of class action rule 
reform in 1996–1998, and directly involved in the second and third episodes. To a 
substantial extent, I draw on those experiences in this Article. As a consequence, it is a 
travelogue of the reform trail. But I am speaking only for myself, not for the Advisory 
Committee or anyone else. 
  At several points in this Article, I do rely on official documents of the rulemaking 
process such as agenda books for meetings of rules committees. These materials are 
publicly accessible on the website of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts: 
www.uscourts.gov. In addition, on occasion I report on events in which I was involved, and 
I do sometimes do not cite to those official documents (some of which I authored) because 
I am reporting on events in which I was personally involved. 
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This Article explores the last half century of class action reform 
in terms of whether further “revolutionary” changes will occur in 
federal class action practice. It finds that although the rulemakers 
looked at some aggressive changes in the 1990s, those 
amendment ideas were eventually jettisoned, and the changes 
actually adopted have been evolutionary rather than 
revolutionary. 
That trend continues with the most recent amendment package, 
which may go into effect on December 1, 2018; the rulemakers 
are not embracing dramatic changes to the rule. Meanwhile, the 
possible sources of “revolutionary” change lie elsewhere. Some 
worry that the Supreme Court will deliver shocks to class action 
practice by deciding cases, though in recent terms it has not 
proved to be as adventurous as some thought it might. Congress 
has pending before it legislation that seemingly would make a 
fairly “revolutionary” commitment to limiting class actions to the 
compensatory purpose, and disavowing the deterrence purpose 
endorsed by many. The fate of that proposed legislation is 
uncertain as of this writing. 
Though action by Congress or decisions by the Supreme Court 
might produce “revolutionary” change for class actions, this 
Article suggests that technology may instead be the most 
important source of major change. In the wired world of the 
twenty-first century, the “headless” class action of the past may 
be replaced by the “wired” class action in which class members 
have regular contact with one another and class counsel. That 
could work a genuine revolution. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Legal change is usually evolutionary, though those who do not 
like a certain change are sometimes prone to term it “radical” or 
“revolutionary” as a way of emphasizing its importance and 
generating opposition. But at least some legal changes do turn out to 
be fairly revolutionary. 
One such revolutionary change was the 1966 amendment of Rule 
23. John Frank, a member of the committee that drafted the 1966 
rule, said it was “the most radical act of rulemaking since the Rule 2 
‘one form of action’ merger of law and equity.”1 As Judge Posner 
observed in 2014: 
The class action is an ingenious procedural innovation that 
enables persons who . . . are too numerous for joinder of their 
claims alleging the same wrong committed by the same 
defendant or defendants to be feasible, to obtain relief as a 
group, a class as it is called. The device is especially important 
when each claim is too small to justify the expense of a separate 
suit, so that without a class action there would be no relief, 
however meritorious the claims.2 
But Professor Redish, the chief academic critic of class actions, 
warns: “The modern class action may be appropriately analogized to 
the invention of fire. If used properly, it can significantly advance 
societal goals. If misused, however, it quickly degenerates into 
something that causes significant harm.”3 
Charles Alan Wright characterized the 1938 version of Rule 23 as 
“a bold and well-intentioned attempt to encourage more frequent use 
 
 1. John K. Rabiej, The Making of Class Action Rule 23—What Were We Thinking?, 
24 MISS. C. L. REV. 323, 325 n.10 (2005) (quoting Minutes, Advisory Committee On Civil 
Rules 15 (Apr. 28–29, 1994), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CV04-
1994-min.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QSH-XBN8]). 
 2. Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 719 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 3. Martin H. Redish & Megan B. Kiernan, Avoiding Death by a Thousand Cuts: The 
Relitigation of Class Certification and the Realities of the Modern Class Action, 99 IOWA L. 
REV. 1659, 1660 (2014) (footnote omitted). 
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of class actions.”4 But that seems to overstate the transformative 
character of the original Rule 23. “The current era of class action 
litigation began on July 1, 1966,” when Rule 23 was substantively 
rewritten.5 Writing as the rule amendments went into effect, Judge 
Frankel forecast that “it will take a generation or so before we can 
fully appreciate the scope, the virtues, and the vices of the new Rule 
23.”6 We have now completed a half century operating under the 
revised rule, a noteworthy event examined in a number of quasi-
celebratory conferences.7 Though the 1966 rule change was hotly 
debated, it is unlikely that those involved in drafting it foresaw its 
revolutionary potential. For example, Professor Wright, who was 
intimately involved in the reform effort, initially expected the new 
provisions authorizing damages class actions would be employed very 
rarely,8 though he recognized by 1969 that his prediction was wrong.9 
Other legal developments—largely an explosion of new claims not 
previously recognized—played a very significant role in magnifying 
the importance of the 1966 amendment. 
Whatever their foresight about the rule’s actual consequences, 
after 1966 the rulemakers reportedly adopted a “moratorium” on 
changing the rule again to see how it worked out.10 Actually, that 
moratorium was fairly brief. By 1971 or so, the committee directed a 
study of the rule,11 but the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (the 
“Advisory Committee”) abandoned the effort in 1977.12 Whether or 
not heeding Judge Frankel’s forecast,13 the Advisory Committee did 
stay its hand for about a generation before taking up the idea of 
 
 4. Charles Alan Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 170 (1969). 
 5. David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm und Drang, 
1953–1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 588 (2013). 
 6. Marvin E. Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 
F.R.D. 39, 52 (1967). 
 7. See Symposium, 1966 and All That: Class Actions and Their Alternatives After 
Fifty Years, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1495 (2017); Conference, Rule 23 @ 50: The 50th 
Anniversary of Rule 23, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 767 (2017). 
 8. See Charles Alan Wright, Recent Changes in the Federal Rules of Procedure, 42 
F.R.D. 552, 567 (1966) (predicting that not very many class actions would be certified 
under Rule 23(b)(3)); see also Rabiej, supra note 1, at 334 & n.43 (reporting Wright’s view, 
and observing that it was one of the rare instances when Wright was wrong about a legal 
development). 
 9. See Wright, supra note 4, at 179 (recognizing that his earlier prediction that Rule 
23(b)(3) would be little used had “proved quite ill-founded”). 
 10. Rabiej, supra note 1, at 328 (referring to “a self-imposed moratorium on further 
amendments”). 
 11. See D. Marcus, supra note 5, at 615. 
 12. See id. at 618–19. 
 13. See supra text accompanying note 6. 
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changing the rule another time. Later in the 1970s, the Carter 
administration developed a class action legislative package that 
would, if adopted, have had a fairly revolutionary potential.14 But that 
legislative initiative did not reach fruition. 
The rulemakers’ moratorium ended in 1991, when the press of 
mass tort litigation in general and asbestos personal injury litigation 
in particular prompted the Judicial Conference to ask the Standing 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure to direct the Advisory 
Committee to consider changes to the rule.15 There followed, by the 
end of that decade, the first episode of consideration of rule-
amendment ideas, largely focused on the certification standards for 
Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, the most revolutionary feature of the 1966 
rewrite. Eventually, all the draft changes to the certification standards 
in Rule 23(b) were withdrawn. Then, in 2000–2002, a second episode 
produced changes in what could be called the procedural handling of 
class actions; these changes went into effect in 2003. Though they 
generated much commentary, nobody really thought them 
revolutionary. 
Meanwhile, other actors have also been involved in the reform 
effort. The Supreme Court has, in the twenty-first century, decided 
quite a large number of class action cases. Although the outcomes 
were a mixed bag from the perspective of plaintiff and defense 
lawyers, the overall trend was not to the plaintiffs’ liking.16 Against 
this background, the Advisory Committee embarked on its third 
serious consideration of changing Rule 23 in 2011, leading to the draft 
amendments published for comment in August 2016. If adopted, they 
could go into effect on December 1, 2018. 
This Article focuses on the most recent and ongoing amendment 
effort. To provide context, however, it first introduces the central 
tension between compensation and deterrence that remains an 
enduring ambiguity, and profiles the evolution of the rule through the 
 
 14. See David Freeman Engstrom, Jacobins at Justice: The (Failed) Class Action 
Revolution of 1978 and the Puzzle of American Procedural Political Economy, 165 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1531, 1531 (2017).  
 15. See Memorandum from Patrick E. Higginbotham, Chair, Advisory Comm. on 
Civil Rules, to Honorable Alicemarie H. Stotler, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure (May 17, 1996), reprinted in 167 F.R.D. 535, 535–36 (1996) 
(transmitting Rule 23 revisions that “result from a course of Committee study that began 
when, in March, 1991, the Judicial Conference requested that [the Standing] Committee 
‘direct the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to study whether Rule 23, F.R.C.P. be 
amended to accommodate the demands of mass tort litigation.’”).  
 16. See generally Richard Marcus, Bending in the Breeze: American Class Actions in 
the Twenty-First Century, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 497, 504–16 (2016) (reviewing these 
developments). 
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earlier rulemaking episodes. The Article then turns to the current 
reform effort, reporting on the variety of ideas considered and laid 
aside, and the ways in which the central tension about the rule’s “true 
goal” remains somewhat unresolved. It then contrasts the rulemakers’ 
evolutionary orientation with the potentially more dramatic changes 
that might emanate from the Supreme Court or Congress, or result 
from developments in technology. The Article concludes that what 
might be called the rulemakers’ studied effort to avoid monocular 
embrace of either compensation or deterrence will likely continue for 
some time. Radical change from the rulemakers is not upon us. 
I.  THE TENSION BETWEEN COMPENSATION AND DETERRENCE 
The age-old conception of private civil litigation is that it was 
designed to provide compensation. Law enforcement was a public 
function, and undertaken by government. But over the last seventy-
five years, the idea of private enforcement of public law has become a 
central feature of American law, one of the features that makes the 
American class action distinct in the world. It was not always so in 
America. 
In a veto message in 1940, President Roosevelt asserted that “[a] 
‘truth in securities’ act without an administrative tribunal to enforce it 
or a labor-relations act without an administrative tribunal to 
administer it, or rate regulation without a commission to supervise 
rates would be sterile and useless.”17 Actually, the private attorney 
general, an idea developed in the early 1940s,18 offered another way. 
And Roosevelt’s first example became an early vehicle for private 
enforcement implementation, as the courts began in 1946 to entertain 
“implied” claims for violation of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act,19 a 
practice the Supreme Court blessed in 1964.20 Only in the Private 
 
 17. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class 
Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 686 (1941) (quoting 86 CONG. REC. 13,942, 13,943 (1940) 
(Walter-Logan Bill—Veto Message)).  
 18. William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why It 
Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2130 & n.2 (2004) (noting that Judge Jerome Frank 
introduced the phrase in 1943). 
 19. See Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (finding an 
implied private cause of action in the Securities Exchange Act). Note that in 1949, the 
Supreme Court said that the derivative action was the “chief regulator of corporate 
management.” Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949). Without 
meaning to detract from that device, it is difficult to think that a contemporary lawyer 
would say the same. 
 20. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964). 
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Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”)21 did Congress, 
somewhat grudgingly, recognize the importance of securities fraud 
litigation. When the Court interpreted the PSLRA pleading 
requirements in 2007, Justice Ginsburg began by invoking that 
history: “This Court has long recognized that meritorious private 
actions to enforce federal antifraud securities laws are an essential 
supplement to criminal prosecutions and civil enforcement actions 
brought, respectively, by the Department of Justice and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission.”22 
Class actions could magnify the effect of private enforcement.23 
As Professors Burbank and Wolff have urged, that is a questionable 
goal of a rule of civil procedure: “Rule 23 does not set policy on the 
propriety of aggregate remedies as a means of accomplishing 
regulatory goals—and it could not possibly do so.”24 Nevertheless, the 
1966 revision to the rule seems to have bolstered private enforcement. 
Consider securities fraud. As Professor Coffee has noted: “Although 
Rule 10b-5 dates back to 1942, it did not truly become important until 
the modern class action was authorized by the revisions to Rule 23 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1966.”25 The 
prospect for private enforcement across a wider range of topics 
emerged in roughly the decade after 1966 due to the multiplication of 
private causes of action with a seemingly regulatory purpose.26 
 
 21. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 22. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007). 
 23. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS RISE, FALL, AND 
FUTURE 175 tbl.9.1 (2015) (comparing dollar amounts recovered by the SEC and private 
class actions; the figure obtained through private class actions dwarfs the SEC recoveries).  
 24. Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed 
Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 21 (2010). 
 25. John C. Coffee, Jr., “Loser Pays”: The Latest Installment in the Battle-Scarred, 
Cliff-Hanging Survival of the Rule 10b-5 Class Action, 68 SMU L. REV. 689, 689–90 (2015) 
(footnote omitted). 
 26. Thus, Professor Miller, who was present during the creation of the 1966 
amendment as an assistant to Reporter Benjamin Kaplan (and was later himself Reporter 
to the Committee) in 2014 offered the following recollection of how matters stood as the 
1966 amendments were under study: 
Those were relatively simple days in the world of litigation. The Committee 
obviously could not predict the great growth in complicated federal and state 
substantive law that would take place in such fields as race, gender, disability, and 
age discrimination; consumer protection; fraud; products liability; environmental 
safety; and pension litigation, let alone the exponential increase in class action and 
multiparty/multi-claim practice that would flow from the expansion of those legal 
subjects. 
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Frequently, legislatures—led by Congress—banned or required 
certain practices and also authorized private suits by those claiming 
injury due to the malefactor’s failure to obey the law. Often these 
statutes also promised a minimum recovery (sometimes labeled a 
“penalty”) and an award of attorney fees for the successful plaintiff.27 
The usual object of these regulatory efforts was a corporation. 
As Professor Hodges says in his massive recent book on how law 
affects corporate behavior, the American legal architecture is 
“somewhat unique,”28 noting “the strong adherence in the United 
States to the ideologies of deterrence and private enforcement.”29 But 
“[i]n contrast to the vast doctrinal literature on the theory and 
practice of private enforcement and class actions in the USA, . . . . 
[t]here is almost no direct evidence on the actual effect of private 
enforcement of law, or on how litigation actually affects corporate 
decisions.”30 As Professor Fitzpatrick has recently observed, there is 
“virtually no empirical evidence that consumer class actions have any 
effect on corporate behavior.”31 
Professor Hodges also emphasizes the remarkable costs and risks 
of American litigation and recognizes that the prospect of being sued 
in the U.S. does supposedly affect corporate conduct.32 As Professor 
 
Arthur R. Miller, The Preservation and Rejuvenation of Aggregate Litigation: A Systemic 
Imperative, 64 EMORY L.J. 293, 293–95 (2014). 
 27. See Sheila B. Scheuerman, Due Process Forgotten: The Problem of Statutory 
Damages and Class Actions, 74 MO. L. REV. 103, 104 n.5 (2009) (offering examples of 
federal statutes imposing statutory damages). Professor Scheuerman observes: “When 
combined with the procedural device of the class action, aggregated statutory damages 
claims can result in absurd liability exposure in the hundreds of millions—or even 
billions—of dollars on behalf of a class whose actual damages are often nonexistent.” Id. 
at 104. 
 28. CHRISTOPHER HODGES, LAW AND CORPORATE BEHAVIOUR: INTEGRATING 
THEORIES OF REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT, COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS 67 (2015). 
 29. Id. at 70. 
 30. Id. at 70–71. Professor Hodges adds, “[t]he basic assumption is that since 
economic theory postulates that the imposition of a financial penalty will deter later 
wrongdoing, it must be so.” Id. at 71. 
 31. Perry Cooper, Are Class Actions About Compensation or Deterrence?, 16 CLASS 
ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA) 1249, 1249 (2015) (quoting Fitzpatrick). Professor Fitzpatrick 
added that there is also no evidence that class actions do not have a deterrent effect. Id. 
 32. HODGES, supra note 28, at 79 (reporting that U.S. corporate chief executives and 
small business owners say that they have closed companies, discontinued products, or 
decided not to release new products due to the risk of lawsuits). It must be emphasized 
that one need not accept the claim that fear of litigation produces these results at face 
value. 
  To the extent the prospect of litigation has played a major role in such decisions, 
class actions are hardly the only reason. Besides class actions, the U.S. legal system 
operates under a set of rules that are extremely plaintiff-friendly compared to the regimes 
in the rest of the world—lax pleading requirements, very broad discovery without the need 
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Fitzpatrick also observed: “You would expect a rational actor to 
avoid litigation.”33 What we seem to have here is a recurring 
conundrum. Both the plaintiff and the defense camps say that 
litigation in general, and class actions in particular, do affect 
corporate conduct. The debate is about whether that is a good thing. 
From what one can call the plaintiff perspective, it must be true 
that more law enforcement is a good thing. Even the proponents of 
economic analysis of law, however, can resist overstating the value of 
the deterrent effect. Writing over forty years ago, for example, 
Professor Dam recognized that “a penalty system that induced 
enforcers to invest resources up the value of an optimal penalty would 
lead to inefficient overenforcement.”34 Thus, “[t]o the extent the class 
action frees the lawyer from weighing the interests of injured class 
members, the result may be inefficient overenforcement.”35 
The defense-side argument is that this sort of overenforcement 
happens all the time, particularly due to class actions. Plaintiff class 
action lawyers not only force changes in behavior that do not benefit 
members of the class (and may be harmful to the interests of some 
class members), the view goes, they also profit hugely off their 
“clients’” claims. Hence the repeated assertion that class actions 
benefit only the lawyers and the antagonism to such devices as 
“coupon settlements” in class actions.36 Balanced against the 
enforcement value of litigation in general, and class actions in 
particular, the defense argument is that corporations usually aspire to 
be good citizens and adhere to legal rules. That conclusion is also 
dubious, according to Professor Hodges’ book.37 Nonetheless, articles 
about the importance corporations place on compliance are rife in the 
 
for advance judicial authorization, the right to jury trial and the resulting limits on judges’ 
deciding plaintiffs lacked sufficient evidence, frequent grounds for recovery of large 
amounts for emotional distress, occasional grounds for recovery of punitive damages, and 
the American Rule under which the successful defendant ordinarily cannot recover its 
attorney fees from the plaintiff. 
 33. Cooper, supra note 31, at 1249. 
 34. Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and 
Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 61 (1975). For a sophisticated contemporary law 
and economics analysis of how a variety of other matters—filing fees, loser pays rules, and 
burdens of proof—bear on optimal private enforcement, see LOUIS KAPLOW, OPTIMAL 
DESIGN OF PRIVATE LITIGATION 1–8 (Harvard Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 928, 
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3017443 [https://perma.cc/G9LG-
RDMQ]. 
 35. Dam, supra note 34, at 61. 
 36. See 28 U.S.C. §	1712 (2012) (limiting the attorney fees paid class counsel who 
negotiate coupon settlements of securities fraud class actions). 
 37. See HODGES, supra note 28, 655–706 (emphasizing that corporate ethics and ethos 
are the prime ingredients of corporate compliance). 
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professional literature.38 Taken to its logical conclusion, this view 
might suggest that no enforcement effort—public or private—is 
needed at all.39 But that is clearly unworkable. Indeed, one can 
imagine even the most ethical corporate CEO wanting enforcement 
to ensnare her scofflaw corporate competitors. 
In sum, the strongest arguments from the two sides present 
diametrically opposite views. The plaintiff-side view is that without 
private enforcement, American companies would run roughshod over 
the legal rights of consumers, investors, employees, and everyone 
else. And the class action is an essential ingredient in this 
enforcement effort. The defense-side view, on the other hand, is that 
compliance is a result of the internal ethics of the company, while 
private litigation—particularly class actions—is a tax on the producers 
of goods and services that enriches lawyers but has no other effect 
(except sometimes depriving the public of goods or services). 
At least some contemporary private enforcement seems difficult 
for the plaintiff side to justify in a wholehearted manner. For 
example, consider the existence of private rights of action for 
penalties. Surely some of the noisome things that justify suits under 
such statutes seem minor. In this vein, Judge Easterbrook recently 
noted in a class action that “[t]his is another of the surprisingly many 
junk-fax suits under . . . the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.”40 
 
 38. For example, the May 2016 issue of the Metropolitan Corporate Counsel 
contained a number of articles about the high importance of vigilance regarding corporate 
compliance. See, e.g., Yogesh Bahl, Continuous Compliance Improvement Using 
Psychology and Behavior, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., May 2016, at 37, 37. An 
interview in the magazine is entitled “Enforcement Goes Into Hyperdrive,” with the 
tagline “In today’s stormy risk environment, a strong culture is the safest harbor.” Richard 
H. Girgenti & Timothy P. Hedley, Enforcement Goes Into Hyperdrive, METROPOLITAN 
CORP. COUNS., May 2016, at 8, 8. Similarly, the former general counsel of General 
Electric has written of “the inside counsel revolution that began in the late 1970s and that 
has increased in scope and power ever since.” Benjamin W. Heineman, Jr., The Inside 
Counsel Revolution, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Mar. 29. 
2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/03/29/the-inside-counsel-revolution [https://perma.cc
/C289-2D4G]. It has been asserted as well that insurance companies foster corporate 
compliance. See, e.g., Shauhin Talesh, Data Breach, Privacy, and Cyber Insurance: How 
Insurance Companies Act as “Compliance Managers” for Business, 43 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 1) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) 
(asserting that “insurance companies play a critical, yet unrecognized, role in assisting 
organizations in complying with privacy laws”).  
 39. Of course, if the inclination of the public enforcers to enforce abates, the 
compliance efforts of the companies may abate also. On this point, the transition from the 
Obama administration to the Trump administration may usher in a striking contrast in 
attitudes toward governmental efforts to force corporations to comply with the law. 
 40. Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 784 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Sask. Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. CE Design, Ltd., 865 F.3d 537, 539 (7th Cir. 2017) (describing the proposed 
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And a defense-side lawyer has said that “[t]he TCPA has become a 
boon to plaintiffs’ lawyers” due to the high cost for defendants of 
going through a full case.41 Professors Burbank and Wolff have noted 
that “[t]here is no reason to believe that the drafters and 
promulgators of the 1966 revisions to Rule 23 anticipated the 
potentially destructive relationship between the damages class action 
and the creation of statutory penalties.”42 One might say the synergy 
between penalty claims and the class action enables plaintiff lawyers 
to use the litigation nuclear weapon to kill a gnat. Presented with a 
request for class certification in an action for “a horrendous, possibly 
annihilating punishment, unrelated to any damage to the purported 
class” under the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) over forty years ago, 
Judge Frankel simply refused.43 
These difficulties might well prompt the sensible to favor public 
enforcement over private enforcement. Sensible regulators would not 
seek to destroy regulated enterprises for no good reason; the whole 
idea of prosecutorial discretion is that applying every rule to the hilt is 
untenable. Partly in recognition of this preference, governmental 
enforcers often have a freer hand in court than private litigants. For 
example, the EEOC need not satisfy Rule 23 when suing in its own 
name.44 But there is no particular reason to think that private 
enforcement is unimportant. Professor Gilles uses as an illustration 
litigation involving a payday lender. After federal regulators settled 
for $325,000 in fines and penalties, a nationwide class action produced 
a settlement for $54.5 million in cash and debt forgiveness.45 Professor 
Coffee has carefully compared the results of SEC actions and class 
action recoveries and found that the private litigation often produced 
 
class representative in a junk fax case as “an Illinois corporation whose business now 
appears to center on litigating claims under the federal Telephone Consumer Protection 
Act”). 
 41. Daniel R. Stoller, CVS Subsidiary Swallows $9.25M Class Junk Fax Pill, 17 CLASS 
ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA) 1308, 1308 (quoting David Almeida, partner at Sheppard, 
Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP).  
 42. Burbank & Wolff, supra note 24, at 74. 
 43. Ratner v. Chem. Bank N.Y. Tr. Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Congress 
later amended the statute to limit the size of the penalty in a TILA class action. 
Amendments to the Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, sec. 408, §	130, 88 Stat. 
1517, 1518–19 (1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §	1640 (2012)).  
 44. EEOC v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, L.L.C., 826 F.3d 791, 797 (5th Cir. 2016) 
(“[T]he EEOC is not required to adhere to Rule 23 when bringing ‘an enforcement action 
.	.	. in its own name.’” (omission in original) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 
323 (1980))). 
 45. Myriam Gilles, Class Warfare: The Disappearance of Low-Income Litigants from 
the Civil Docket, 65 EMORY L.J. 1531, 1542 (2016). 
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much larger amounts.46 And Professors Choi and Pritchard have 
found that the “conventional wisdom that the SEC targets disclosure 
violations more precisely” than private plaintiffs’ lawyers is wrong.47 
Professor Clopton, meanwhile, has elegantly explored the more 
general question of “redundant” public-private enforcement.48 And, 
as Professor Lemos has recently observed, public enforcement may 
raise its own problems of accountability.49 
Another wrinkle to this debate is very pertinent nowadays. As 
Professor Farhang pointed out, private enforcement may look 
desirable to legislators because it is not dependent on the preferences 
of the executive, which can shift over time.50 If elections cannot blunt 
private enforcement, then one need not rely entirely on agencies’ 
willingness to enforce. In the Obama administration, some argued 
that the administration’s orientation was unduly pro-enforcement. 
The Economist, for example, reported in 2014 that the U.S. 
government was “criminalizing the American company” and 
described a strategy called “derisking” as “a pre-emptive cringe in the 
face of American regulation.”51 There are some indications that 
things are very different in the Trump administration. For example, 
reports indicate that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
might be a target because it “has been a little too effective in pursuing 
wrongdoing by banks, consumer credit reporting companies, credit 
issuers and student loan collectors.”52 The very people responsible for 
governmental enforcement reportedly “dread” the attitudes and 
policies of the new administration.53 
The unique features of U.S. litigation54 mean that private 
enforcers need not be secondary to public enforcers, at least when 
 
 46. See COFFEE, supra note 23, at 175 tbl.9.1. 
 47. Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, SEC Investigations and Securities Class Actions: 
An Empirical Comparison, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27, 29 (2016).  
 48. See Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant Public-Private Enforcement, 69 VAND. L. 
REV. 285, 285 (2016). 
 49. See Margaret Lemos, Democratic Enforcement? Accountability and Independence 
for the Litigation State, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 929, 929 (2017). 
 50. SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATIONS AND PRIVATE 
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 34–37 (2010). 
 51. A Mammoth Guilt Trip, ECONOMIST, Aug. 30, 2014, at 21; Poor Correspondents, 
ECONOMIST, June 14, 2014, at 77 (reporting on “derisking” efforts to banks).  
 52. Gretchen Morgenson, A Watchdog Too Good at its Job, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 
2017, at BU1; Alan Rappeport, Consumer Watchdog Faces Attack by House Republicans, 
Memo Reveals, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2017, at A14. 
 53. Michael D. Shear & Eric Lichtblau, Civil Servants Sense “Dread” in Trump Era, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2017, at A1 (referring to worries among staff when the president 
“recruited cabinet secretaries hostile to the agencies they lead”).  
 54. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.  
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compared to enforcement outside the U.S. A striking illustration is 
provided by the ongoing litigation about Volkswagen air pollution 
devices. As is well-known, an avalanche of class action and other 
litigation against VW occurred in U.S. courts, eventually concentrated 
in U.S. District Court in San Francisco and leading to a settlement 
that provided a buy-back benefit to American purchasers of the 
affected cars. As reported by the New York Times, “Volkswagen 
owners in the United States will receive about $20,000 per car as 
compensation for the company’s diesel deception. Volkswagen 
owners in Europe at most get a software update and a short length of 
plastic tubing.”55 A German purchaser of a VW asked: “Why are they 
getting so much and we’re getting nothing?”56 The EU Commissioner 
of Industry told a German newspaper that “Volkswagen should 
voluntarily pay European car owners compensation comparable with 
that which it will pay U.S. consumers.”57 That seemingly did not 
happen, and the Financial Times reported in January 2017 that a 
major part of the reason was that “US-style class action lawsuits do 
not exist in Germany.”58 Moreover, there have been indications that 
governmental regulators in Europe responded less vigorously to 
VW’s behavior than parallel officials in the U.S. 
The foregoing presents at most a tiny introduction to the vast 
literature about the competing virtues and vices of private 
enforcement. As Professor Mullenix has said in a slightly different 
context, this debate “inevitably deteriorates into a boilerplate 
conclusory swearing contest between rule supporters and 
opponents.”59 Meanwhile, “academics writing in this area either have 
been so ideologically committed to the private attorney general 
concept or so implacably opposed to it that, in either case, they have 
missed the divergences between theory and practice.”60 Little wonder, 
then, that the framers of the modern class action rule—presented with 
the choice between a compensation and deterrence rationale—chose 
to “muddle through without picking sides.”61 As we shall see, the 
debates during the current rulemaking effort significantly reflect 
 
 55. Jack Ewing, New Strategy Against VW, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2016, at B1. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Robert A. Weninger, The VW Diesel Emissions Scandal and the Spanish Class 
Action, 23 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 91, 99 (2016).  
 58. Patrick McGee, VW Sued in Germany Over Car Emission Test Scandal, FIN. 
TIMES, Jan. 4, 2017, at 3.  
 59. Linda S. Mullenix, The Constitutionality of the Proposed Rule 23 Class Action 
Amendments, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 615, 618 (1997) (discussing the Rules Enabling Act). 
 60. COFFEE, supra note 23, at 219. 
 61. D. Marcus, supra note 5, at 597. 
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competing conceptions of this divide, and one could say that there is 
again a studied effort by the rulemakers to avoid embracing the 
strongest position on either side. 
II.  THE FIRST TWO EPISODES OF RULE 23 REFORM 
Between 1966 and 1991, much happened as class action practice 
evolved and matured. After an initial burst of enthusiasm, much 
uneasiness developed, leading to something of a retreat from the 
broadest use of class actions.62 In addition, there were legislative 
proposals to make major revisions in the handling of class actions.63 
But the rule remained unchanged. 
The most significant development was that, with increasing 
frequency, the parties reached a settlement before the court decided 
whether to certify the class, and the possibility of “settlement class 
certification” appeared. By the time mass torts emerged in the 1980s, 
defendants realized that class action settlements could offer an upside 
because their binding effect could permit an enterprise to close its 
books on an episode at a fixed expense.64 At the extreme, such 
arrangements could be seen as substituting a court-approved remedy 
for the tort law regime that would otherwise apply.65 
Class action claims administration emerged as something of an 
industry unto itself. In the settlement setting, exacting claims 
requirements could come close to turning victory into defeat. Claims 
rates following settlements were often low.66 Even sophisticated class 
members often did not apply for the money due them from a 
settlement fund.67 Sometimes the claims processes themselves seemed 
 
 62. For discussion, see Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining 
Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 676–82 
(1979).  
 63. See supra text accompanying note 14. 
 64. On this topic, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling 
Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 370–75 
(2000). 
 65. For discussion, see Richard L. Marcus, They Can’t Do That, Can They? Mass Tort 
Reform via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 858, 859 (1995). 
 66. See Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems 
and Class Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 119 (2007) (“It is not unusual for only 10 
or 15% of the class members to bother filing claims.”); cf. Zimmer Paper Prods., Inc. v. 
Berger & Montague, P.C., 758 F.2d 86, 92–93 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that class counsel did 
not have a fiduciary duty to follow up with another notice after notice by first class mail 
resulted in submission of claims by only 12% of class members). 
 67. See, e.g., James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your 
Fingers: Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions 
to Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 413 (2005) 
(describing failure of financial institutions to make claims in securities class actions). 
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almost to be designed to deter claims.68 Sometimes settlement 
agreements would include “reversion” provisions that permitted the 
defendant to get back unclaimed funds at the end of the claims 
period,69 which possibly gave it an incentive to make the claims 
process arduous. Class counsel, meanwhile, might be able to claim 
attorney fees based on the face “value” of the claims fund created for 
the class rather than the relief actually received by class members who 
submitted claims.70 This is not to say that such practices were 
pervasive or even frequent, but this collection of concerns did tend to 
besmirch the reputation of American class actions. 
In terms of potentially revolutionary change, the first two 
experiences with amending Rule 23 produced an evolution away from 
revolution that has continued through the most recent episode. 
A. 1991–1998 
In 1991, after a quarter century of muddling through without 
picking sides in the compensation/deterrence debate, the Advisory 
Committee was asked to study possible changes to Rule 23,71 and it 
embarked on a five-year study of ideas for changing the rule. At first, 
rather aggressive changes were given serious consideration. The first 
draft considered by the Advisory Committee retained Rule 23(a) 
unchanged but collapsed the categories under Rule 23(b) into a single 
superiority inquiry that invited consideration of seven factors.72 It also 
 
 68. See, e.g., Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., 772 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 2014) (describing the 
online claim form in a consumer class action as “bound to discourage filings”). 
 69. For an early example of a reversion provision in a litigated case, see Boeing Co. v. 
Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 477 (1980) (unclaimed funds in class action would revert to 
defendant after claims period). 
 70. See id. at 482 (holding that counsel fees should be charged against the entire 
damages award in a class action, even though many class members did not claim their 
share). 
 71. See Memorandum from Patrick E. Higginbotham to Honorable Alicemarie H. 
Stotler, supra note 15, at 535.  
 72. See 1 WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULE 23, at 3–18 (May 1, 1997) [hereinafter 1 
WORKING PAPERS], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/workingpapers-vol1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B6G4-P795 (staff uploaded archive)]. The four-volume compilation of 
the various drafts considered, minutes of the pertinent meetings, transcripts of the various 
hearings, and written comments submitted during the public comment period, is an 
invaluable source on the development of the 1996 package of draft amendments. 
  It is worth noting that during the 2011–2017 reform episode there was at least one 
proposal for a comprehensive rewriting of the certification standards in Rule 23(a) and 
(b). See Letter from Adam Steinman, Professor, Univ. of Ala. Sch. of Law, to Edward 
Cooper, Robert Klonoff & Richard Marcus, Members, Rule 23 Subcomm. (Feb. 24, 2015), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USC-RULES-CV-2016-0004-0003 [https://perma.cc
/7FWG-AKLM] (follow attachment). 
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broadened the right to opt out to all class actions but provided that 
allowing opt-outs was discretionary with the court, which could 
condition exclusion on a prohibition against assertion of certain 
claims that would be concluded by the class action.73 The amendment 
would also have adopted a uniform notice requirement for all class 
actions, to be given in a manner subject to the court’s discretion.74 In 
addition, it dealt explicitly with such questions as deciding the merits 
before class certification75 and immediate appeal of the class-
certification order.76 
Frankly, in light of what has happened since, this early discussion 
draft appears fairly aggressive, if not revolutionary. Features of it 
resemble proposals made before the Advisory Committee began 
work.77 It would have introduced a whole new ball game into the 
question of whether a case should be certified as a class. It would 
have made predominance of common questions—so important in 
current practice—only a factor in assessing superiority, not the major 
factor as it has been in most cases to date. 
This initial draft was only a starting point. It was succeeded by 
further drafts and meeting minutes that fill some 275 pages of the 
compilation of the Committee’s class action work.78 Ultimately, it led 
to the publication of a proposed amendment package in 1996.79 As 
Professor Mullenix viewed it, during this period the Committee 
“moved from a wholesale rule revision to a more ‘minimalist’ 
approach to revamping the existing class action rule”80—from a 
possibly revolutionary to an evolutionary posture. Nevertheless, what 
it proposed was denounced as revolutionary. A Steering Committee 
to Oppose Proposed Rule 23 was organized by a dozen prominent law 
professors (including one former Reporter of the Committee), and it 
 
 73. See 1 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 72, at 6–7. 
 74. See id. at 7–8.  
 75. See id. at 9–10. 
 76. Id. at 11–12. 
 77. See AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LITIG., REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON CLASS ACTION IMPROVEMENTS, reprinted in 110 F.R.D. 195, 
200–03 (1986). The ABA’s recommendation proposes replacing Rule 23(b) with a single 
category keyed to whether a class action would be superior and making that determination 
turn on multiple factors. It also called for notice in all class actions and made opting out 
discretionary with the court. It also explicitly authorized pre-certification resolution of 
merits motions.  
 78. See 1 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 72, at 19–296. 
 79. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Appellate, Civil, and Criminal Procedure, 167 F.R.D. 523, 540–66 (Aug. 1996).  
 80. Mullenix, supra note 59, at 616. For an intriguing retrospective on the various 
more aggressive amendment ideas for Rule 23, see Scott Dodson, A Negative Retrospective 
on Rule 23, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 917, 921–25 (2017). 
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submitted a six-page critique of the preliminary draft that was 
eventually signed by 144 law professors.81 Many witnesses appeared at 
the public hearings to object to the amendment proposals. Eventually 
Judge Niemeyer, the Chair of the Advisory Committee, had all the 
material generated in the amendment effort published as a four-
volume set.82 
Much of the controversy resulted from the proposal to add a new 
factor (F) to the list of considerations bearing on whether to certify 
under Rule 23(b)(3): “whether the probable relief to individual class 
members justifies the costs and burdens of class litigation.”83 
Although the amendment proposal came with an introduction that 
recognized the potential importance of deterrence as a justification 
for class certification,84 this provision became a lightning rod in the 
public comment period. For example, the opposition letter signed by 
144 law professors observed: 
Proposed Rule 23(b)(3)(F) ignores the importance of deterring 
wrongful conduct that injures each individual slightly but in the 
aggregate costs society a good deal. Rule 23(b)(3) was 
conceived originally as a procedural device to facilitate the 
enforcement of laws that prohibit socially costly behavior that 
 
 81. See 2 WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULE 23, at 1–9 (May 1, 1997) [hereinafter 2 
WORKING PAPERS], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/workingpapers-vol2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SY4M-V2VR (staff uploaded archive)]. 
 82. See supra note 72.  
 83. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments, 167 F.R.D. at 559. The other 
principal concern of the law professors was a proposal to add a new Rule 23(b)(4), 
authorizing certification of a (b)(3) class for purposes of settlement “even though the 
requirements of subdivision (b)(3) might not be met for purposes of trial.” Id. at 559. The 
professors objected that this proposal was standardless and “lends official approval to an 
extremely controversial practice, one plagued by serious agency problems and risks of 
collusion.” 2 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 81, at 1.  
 84. The official publication included draft minutes from the Advisory Committee 
meeting: 
Class actions have become an important element of private attorney-general 
enforcement of many statutes.	.	.	. [T]here may be indirect benefits to the public at 
large in deterring wrongdoing, and in some cases, it may be desirable to force 
disgorgement of wrongful profits without regard to individual benefits. The 
question is in part whether it is wise to rely on private enforcement through Rule 
23 rather than specific Congressionally mandated private enforcement devices—
and whether the question is different as to statutes enacted before Rule 23 
enforcement had become well recognized than as to more recent statutes. 
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments, 167 F.R.D. at 541. 
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involves small wrongs to large numbers of people. Proposed 
Rule 23(b)(3)(F) would operate to defeat those same laws.85 
After the public comment period, the Advisory Committee met 
to consider the response. As reflected in the minutes: 
Perhaps the greatest attention was drawn by proposed Rule 
23(b)(3)(F), which would allow a court to deny class 
certification because the probable relief to individual class 
members does not justify the costs and burdens of class 
litigation. The reactions to this proposal demonstrated that it 
goes to the very heart of the purpose of Rule 23.86 
After a discussion about “philosophical questions as to the 
proper role of Rule 23”87 and “cosmic choices about public law 
regulation through Rule 23,”88 the Committee decided not to 
recommend adoption of that factor (or any other change to Rule 
23(b)(3)) but to continue considering it. At its fall meeting in October 
1997, after a discussion about “a philosophical chasm on small-claims 
classes,” the Committee voted (with one dissent) to abandon further 
consideration of this factor.89 More generally, of all the features of the 
preliminary draft of possible amendments, only Rule 23(f), on 
discretionary review of class-certification decisions, went forward. 
Perhaps one could say the Committee continued “muddl[ing] 
through.”90 
B. 2000–2003 
In 2000, the Advisory Committee resumed working on Rule 23. 
As introduced when the resulting amendment proposals emerged in 
2001, “[t]he class action rule ha[d] been the subject of close study by 
the Civil Rules Advisory Committee over the past ten years.”91 This 
time, the Committee “turned its attention away from the substantive 
standards for certification to matters of process and procedure.”92 
 
 85. 2 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 81, at 6. 
 86. Minutes, Advisory Committee On Civil Rules 4 (May 1–2, 1997), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/cv5-97.pdf [https://perma.cc/9K3W-7CEJ].  
 87. Id. at 9. 
 88. Id. at 19. 
 89. Minutes, Advisory Committee On Civil Rules 21 (Oct. 6–7, 1997), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/cv10-97.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZL7W-JZ7Z].  
 90. See D. Marcus, supra note 5, at 597. 
 91. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy, 
Civil and Criminal Procedure and Rules of Evidence, 201 F.R.D. 560, 587 (Aug. 15, 2001).  
 92. Id. at 590. 
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Thus, the proposed amendments did not on their face seem to engage 
with the challenging question of the purpose of class actions.93 
Nevertheless, somewhat similar concerns emerged from the 
public hearings. One proposed amendment would have called for 
“notice by means calculated to reach a reasonable number of class 
members” whenever a class action was certified.94 Previously, the only 
notice required upon class certification was in Rule 23(b)(3) class 
actions, which meant that actions certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or 
23(b)(2) could proceed to judgment without there ever having been 
notice to class members. The new provision was explained by a draft 
Committee Note: 
Members of classes certified under Rules 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) 
cannot request exclusion, but have interests that should be 
protected by notice. These interests often can be protected 
without requiring the exacting efforts to effect individual notice 
to identifiable class members that stem from the right to elect 
exclusion from a (b)(3) class.95 
Though this addition to the rule may seem moderate, it met with 
strong resistance, particularly among the civil rights community. The 
concern was that even a very moderate notice requirement would 
deter lawyers from taking civil rights cases and thus defeat the law-
implementation purpose of class actions.96 After the public comment 
period, this directive was removed, and there still is no requirement in 
the rule of any notice to class members in (b)(1) or (b)(2) cases unless 
they are settled. 
III.  THE EVOLUTION OF THE 2016 PACKAGE: OUTREACH AND 
ISSUES DEFERRED 
In 2011, the Advisory Committee again returned to Rule 23. In 
part, that was because enough time had passed since the 2003 
amendments to permit reflection on the operation of the rule as 
 
 93. Among the changes were a modification of the rule’s timing requirement from 
directing that class certification be decided “as soon as practicable” to calling for decision 
“at an early practicable time,” requiring that the order certifying a class describe the class 
claims and defenses, and directing that notice of certification be in “plain, easily 
understood language.” The package also contained new subdivisions 23(g) (appointment 
of class counsel) and 23(h) (attorney fee awards in class actions). Id. at 603–06.  
 94. See id. at 606. 
 95. Id. at 611.  
 96. See Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, in AGENDA BOOK OF THE 
STANDING COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 1, 145–58 (June 
2002), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/ST2002-06%282%29.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CSW7-T92R].  
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amended that year. In part, that was because Congress had in 2005 
passed the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), which made a 
review of practice under the new statute appropriate. In part, that was 
because the Supreme Court had decided quite a few class action 
cases, and examination of the operation of the rule in light of those 
cases seemed warranted. The task was assigned to a Rule 23 
Subcommittee. 
As it was in 1991–2001, the process was deliberative. By spring 
2012, the Subcommittee had identified a series of “front burner” 
issues: (1) settlement class certification; (2) consideration of the 
merits in connection with class certification; (3) issue classes; (4) 
criteria for settlement review; and (5) monetary relief in actions 
certified under Rule 23(b)(2).97 Shortly thereafter, the Advisory 
Committee’s full energies were absorbed by the completion and 
public comment process regarding the discovery and related 
amendments that went into effect in 2015.98 
In 2014, the Subcommittee resumed work on Rule 23. One part 
of this work involved outreach. Members of the Subcommittee 
attended and participated at more than a dozen bar gatherings 
involving a broad array of litigators.99 Within the Committee, this 
 
 97. Rule 23 Subcommittee Report, in AGENDA BOOK OF THE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 449, 455–64 (Mar. 2012), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites
/default/files/fr_import/CV2012-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4H8-DJD8].  
 98. The 2015 amendments attracted an unprecedented amount of interest. More than 
2,300 written comments were submitted between August 2013 and February 2014. Each of 
the three public hearings was oversubscribed, and some 120 witnesses testified in the 
hearings. The Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on the amendment package on 
November 5, 2013, before the Advisory Committee had even held its first hearing. Shortly 
after the amendments went into effect, Chief Justice Roberts devoted most of his year-end 
message to the rule changes. 
 99. See Report of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, in AGENDA BOOK OF THE 
STANDING COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 189, 190–91 (Jan. 
2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2016-01-standing-agenda-book.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7FRX-QALU] (listing the following events: (1) ABA 18th Class Action 
Institute, Chicago, Oct. 23–24, 2014; (2) Lawyers for Civil Justice Membership Meeting, 
New York, Dec. 4–5, 2014; (3) Impact Fund 13th Annual Class Action Conference, 
Berkeley, Feb. 26–27, 2015; (4) George Washington University Roundtable on Settlement 
Class Actions, Washington, Apr. 8, 2015; (5) ALI discussion of Rule 23 issues, 
Washington, May 17, 2015; (6) ABA Litigation Section meeting, San Francisco, June 19, 
2015; (7) American Association for Justice Annual Meeting, Montreal, July 12, 2015; (8) 
Civil Procedure Professors’ Conference, Seattle, July 17, 2015; (9) Duke Law Conference 
on Class-Action Settlement, Washington, July 23–24, 2015; (10) Defense Research 
Institute Conference on Class Actions, Washington, July 23–24, 2015; (11) Rule 23 
Subcommittee Mini-Conference, DFW Airport, Sept. 11, 2015; (12) National Consumer 
Law Center Consumer Class Action Symposium, San Antonio, Nov. 14–15, 2015; (13) 
Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting, New York, Jan. 8, 2016). 
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effort was sometimes jokingly referred to as the Subcommittee’s 
“Grand Tour,” but it paid dividends in providing nuance to the 
Subcommittee’s understanding of the issues. Indeed, this outreach 
was even commented upon favorably by some who appeared before 
the Advisory Committee during the public comment period 
addressing the preliminary draft of proposed amendments.100 
In September 2015, the Subcommittee held a mini-conference 
with lawyers from a spectrum of backgrounds to discuss its evolving 
list of issues. As of that point, the topics focused upon were: (1) 
“frontloading” of specifics about proposed settlements; (2) expanded 
treatment of the settlement approval criteria; (3) guidance in handling 
cy pres provisions; (4) improvements in the rules regarding objections 
by class members to proposed settlements; (5) class definition and 
“ascertainability”; (6) settlement class certification; (7) issue class 
certification; (8) notice methods attuned to twenty-first century 
communication realities; and (9) pick-off settlement offers to the 
named plaintiff early in proposed class actions.101 
At its November 2015 meeting, the Advisory Committee 
approved removing several of these issues from the active agenda, 
and perhaps entirely removing them from the agenda102: cy pres, 
ascertainability, settlement class certification, issue classes, and pick-
off offers. Although some of these issues are remote from the central 
tension between compensation and deterrence, in general they have 
overtones of that conundrum and illustrate the ongoing challenge of 
emphatic embrace of either the pure compensation or the pure 
deterrence rationale. In particular, cy pres, ascertainabilty, and the 
“no injury” class especially point up the compensation-deterrence 
tension, so they merit a closer look. 
 
  The Subcommittee received more than twenty-five written submissions about 
possible changes to Rule 23 during the time it was considering possible rule change ideas. 
Id. at 191.  
 100. See Summary of Comments and Testimony, in AGENDA BOOK OF THE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 131, 132–33 (Apr. 2017), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2017-04-civil-agenda_book.pdf [https://perma.cc
/NYA6-WYX3] (summarizing testimony at hearings).  
 101. See Memorandum Prepared for Mini-Conference, in AGENDA BOOK OF THE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 187, 187–88 (Nov. 2015), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2015-11-civil-agenda_book_0.pdf [https://perma.cc
/L5T3-PGB4].  
 102. See Rule 23 Subcommittee Report, in AGENDA BOOK OF THE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, supra note 101, at 87, 89–91.  
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A. Cy Pres 
At almost the same time that Rule 23 was transformed in 1966, 
the Supreme Court of California confronted a proposed state court 
class action involving alleged overcharges by Yellow Cab in Los 
Angeles, supposedly accomplished by setting the meters to charge a 
rate higher than was authorized by the Public Utilities Commission.103 
The named plaintiff in Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.104 alleged that he had 
ridden in cabs and paid the inflated rate, and he sued on behalf of a 
class of all those who had also paid the inflated rate.105 The problem 
was that, although Yellow Cab had records from which the amount of 
the overcharges could be calculated, there was no obvious way to 
identify the other passengers who had paid the inflated rates.106 The 
trial court held that it was not a proper class action under California 
standards. 
The state supreme court held that the case was a proper class 
action even though the specific identities of mulcted passengers could 
not then be determined. Its rationale emphasized the deterrence 
objective: 
[A]bsent a class suit, recovery by any of the individual taxicab 
users is unlikely. . . . It is more likely that, absent a class suit, 
defendant will retain the benefits from its alleged wrongs. A 
procedure that would permit allegedly injured parties to 
recover the amount of their overpayments is to be preferred 
over the foregoing alternative.107 
In a footnote, the court recognized that the Attorney General of 
California, as amicus curiae, had proposed that the solution to this 
problem was to have the total amount of the overcharges deposited 
with the trial court, permit class members to obtain reimbursement by 
presenting proof that they had been overcharged, and direct that the 
uncollected portion of the money escheat to the state as abandoned 
funds at the end of seven years.108 The Supreme Court said that this 
idea was “prematurely raised,” and that the trial court should 
“determine the manner in which any further proceedings will be 
conducted.”109 Thereafter, the parties settled with a provision that 
 
 103. See Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 433 P.2d 732, 735–36 (Cal. 1967). 
 104. 433 P.2d 732 (Cal. 1967). 
 105. Id. at 736. 
 106. Id. at 740. 
 107. Id. at 746. 
 108. See id. at 746 n.15. 
 109. Id. 
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some $950,000 of the settlement amount be provided by having 
Yellow Cab lower its meters below the authorized fare.110 
From this acorn, a mighty oak of cy pres doctrine and creativity 
has grown. As the Ninth Circuit put it in a 2017 decision, defense 
arguments against certification in that case ran up against “our court’s 
longstanding cy pres jurisprudence.”111 So also elsewhere; the 
prevalence of cy pres arrangements proliferated to a possibly 
unnerving point. As a 2007 article in the New York Times put it: 
“Judges all over the country have gotten into the business of doling 
out leftover class action settlement money, sometimes to 
organizations only tangentially related to the subject of the lawsuit. 
Hospitals are popular, as are law schools and legal aid societies.”112 
Sometimes charities even lobbied judges to obtain favorable 
treatment.113 Uneasiness with these practices understandably rose. 
Two very different conceptions of the cy pres phenomenon can 
be imagined. 
Maximalist use of cy pres: In a case like Daar, cy pres seems to 
approach a perfect solution. On the one hand, although it is not 
guaranteed that the beneficiaries of the lowered taxi meter rates are 
exactly the same people who paid the higher rates during the earlier 
period, it is likely that many of them are. More generally, the benefits 
are conferred on users of taxis in Los Angeles, which corresponds 
pretty closely to the class definition. 
Beyond that, and in a sense more significantly from the 
perspective of the adherent of the maximalist view, this method 
denies the wrongdoer the spoils of the wrongdoing. As Professor 
Tidmarsh put it recently: “I take as a given the basic argument for cy 
pres relief: courts should attempt to achieve the greatest feasible level 
of deterrence.”114 That objective, of course, does not depend on 
delivering the money to the victims, much as that result may be 
applauded. Realism shows that (as in Daar) it may be very difficult or 
 
 110. See 4 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS 30 
n.13 (4th ed. 2002) (describing settlement). It is important to note that in federal court cy 
pres provisions are limited to settlement situations. The California court could authorize 
this sort of substantive remedy as part of its class action process, but trying to do the same 
thing by rule in the federal court system would raise serious questions about the 
rulemaking power. 
 111. Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 112. Adam Liptak, Doling Out Other People’s Money, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2007, at 
A14. 
 113. See id. 
 114. Jay Tidmarsh, Cy Pres and the Optimal Class Action, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 767, 
773 (2014).  
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impossible to identify all the victims. Surely that circumstance should 
not enable the wrongdoer to retain the spoils. 
The argument can be carried further. If the cost or difficulty of 
identifying the victims makes that prospect uninviting, one may 
identify organizations that serve the public interest that are in dire 
need of funding. Cy pres funding could be an important source of that 
funding. In California, there is even a statute that directs that the 
court order class action funds left unclaimed to be paid to nonprofit 
organizations that benefit the class or promote the law consistent with 
the objectives of the claim asserted in the case, or alternatively to 
“child advocacy programs; or nonprofit organizations providing civil 
legal services to the indigent.”115 At least in California, then, state 
court judges are supposed to deploy unclaimed class action funds to 
“Good Works” of the sort blessed by the legislature. The Advisory 
Committee has been urged to foster use of cy pres to achieve similar 
ends, at least in the settlement setting.116 
Putting aside issues of self-dealing (“Let’s direct the money to 
the judge’s favorite charity”), this activity might be unnerving to 
 
 115. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §	384(b)(3)(C) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 2 of 2018 
Reg. Sess.).  
 116. See, e.g., Letter from Christine Pedigo Bartholomew, Assoc. Professor of Law, 
Univ. at Buffalo Law Sch., to Rebecca A. Womeldorf, Rules Comm. Support Office (Apr. 
7, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USC-RULES-CV-2016-0004-0017 
[https://perma.cc/K9NA-52W0] (follow attachment) (submitting a draft of her article 
Saving Charitable Settlements, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 3241 (2015), which asserts that 
“[c]haritable settlement challengers raise basic questions about whether the purpose of a 
damages class action is compensation or social justice,” id. at 3245, and that “[t]he better 
view is that compensation is just a by-product of a class action’s regulatory function,” id. at 
3258); Letter from Jocelyn D. Larkin, Exec. Dir., Impact Fund, to Comm. on Rules of 
Practice & Procedure 4 (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USC-
RULES-CV-2016-0004-0063 [https://perma.cc/7LNL-GBZZ] (follow attachment) (noting 
that “cy pres funds are providing, in many cases, a vital source of funding to legal services 
programs across the country”); Letter from Sheila O’Sullivan, Exec. Dir., & Noah C. 
Samuels, Deputy Dir., NW Consumer Law Ctr., to the Advisory Comm. on Rules of Civil 
Procedure 2 (May 15, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USC-RULES-
CV-2016-0004-0021 [https://perma.cc/6E54-JD4Y] (follow attachment) (asserting that 
“[c]y pres awards are a crucial source of funding for organizations like the Northwest 
Consumer Law Center .	.	.	, which strengthens our economy by empowering and protecting 
the consumers who contribute to it every day”); Letter from Nat’l Legal Aid & Def. Ass’n 
et al., to Comm. on Rules of Practice Procedure 4 (Sept. 8, 2015), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USC-RULES-CV-2016-0004-0026 [https://perma.cc
/87L8-4FYX] (follow attachment) (referring to cy pres grants as “a critical funding source 
for legal services organizations and foundations”); Letter from Diane L. Webb, Chief 
Program Officer & Gen. Counsel, Legal Aid at Work, to Comm. on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure 3 (Feb. 15, 2017) https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USC-RULES-CV-
2016-0004-0086 [https://perma.cc/86PT-ZQDW] (follow attachment) (asserting that “cy pres 
is essential to our organization’s mission and its continued sustainability”). 
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many judges. One might almost regard it as a form of taxation by 
courts that intrudes on the legislature’s authority to make 
appropriation choices.117 Concerns have arisen about federal agencies 
or the executive using funds for purposes not authorized by 
Congress.118 Judicial “funding” may seem even more dubious. But 
were one to embrace fully the deterrence rationale for class actions 
and disregard the compensation goal, this maximalist attitude could 
support regular use of settlement funds properly taken from 
wrongdoers to do Good Works. 
Minimalist use of cy pres: As one would expect, this approach is 
very different from the maximalist use. The starting point is that it is 
very rare (or perhaps unknown) that any class action claims process 
achieves 100% payout. The Advisory Committee was repeatedly told 
that during the public comment period.119 There’s always somebody 
who doesn’t cash the check.120 In view of that recurrent reality, 
disregarding the problem of a residue after the claims process may be 
creating more problems. 
The American Law Institute Aggregate Litigation Principles 
grappled with these issues and concluded that settlement funds “are 
presumptively the property of the class members.”121 Of course, that 
view need not be absolute; the possibility that the undistributed 
residue would revert to the defendant points to a different view.122 
From its starting point, the ALI reasoned that ordinarily the 
remaining funds should be paid to class members as additional 
 
 117. For an example of such an argument, see Judge Brown’s dissenting opinion in 
Keepseagle v. Perdue, 856 F.3d 1039, 1058–79 (D.C. Cir. 2017). The case involved 
disposition of the $380 million residue of funds allocated by Congress to settle a class 
action. Id. at 1058. Judge Brown argued that the distribution of this money violated the 
Constitution’s Appropriations Clause, asserting that “this case exposes a peril to the 
public fisc with which the framers never reckoned: cy pres.” Id. at 1059. 
 118. See, e.g., Mila Sohoni, On Dollars and Deference: Agencies, Spending, and 
Economic Rights, 66 DUKE L.J. 1677, 1686–1701 (2017) (discussing efforts by the 
executive to underwrite large-scale economic entitlements without clear statutory 
authority). 
 119. See Summary of Comments and Testimony, supra note 100, at 134–44 
(summarizing testimony and comments received).  
 120. See, e.g., Michael R. Pennington, Transcript of Proceedings, Advisory Committee 
Meeting on the Rules of Civil Procedure 8 (Feb. 2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites
/default/files/transcript_of_2-16-17_hearing_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/C337-Q8RF] (asserting 
that claims rates will always be lower than 100%).  
 121. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION §	3.07 cmt. b (AM. LAW 
INST. 2010). 
 122. The ALI view rejects reversion because it “would undermine the deterrence 
function of class actions.” Id. 
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compensation unless that is infeasible.123 Thus, cy pres could be 
employed only when—either because of the cost of distribution or 
because class members cannot be identified—additional payments to 
class members are not possible. In those cases, payment should be to 
“a recipient whose interests reasonably approximate those being 
pursued by the class.”124 Obviously, the ALI approach hews rather 
closely to the compensation orientation and is “minimalist” because it 
permits payment to others only when there is no feasible alternative. 
Eventually, the Advisory Committee decided not to address cy 
pres by rule amendment. 
B. Ascertainability 
For decades, it has been recognized that a class must be defined. 
It does not suffice for a court to certify a class of “all those similarly 
situated” to the plaintiff. One must explain what similarity suffices. 
Indeed, since 2003 Rule 23 itself has said that the court’s certification 
order “must define the class.”125 That can be important when it comes 
time to send notice of certification to the class.126 It also is important 
when there is a settlement127 or the court is considering class counsel’s 
request for attorney fees.128 The definition is also central to the 
preclusive effect of the class action judgment.129 
One simple way might be to define the class as “all those injured 
by defendant’s actions,” or something of the sort. But that creates the 
“fail-safe” problem, because the existence of the class depends on the 
plaintiff winning.130 In another sort of case, one might define the class 
 
 123. One could contend that these class members would be unjustly enriched. But as 
the ALI recognized, “few settlements award 100 percent of a class member’s losses, and 
thus it is unlikely in most cases that further distributions to class members would result in 
more than 100 percent recovery for those class members.” Id. 
 124. Id. §	3.07(c). 
 125. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B). 
 126. See id. 23(c)(2)(B) (directing “individual” notice in (b)(3) class actions).  
 127. See id. 23(e)(1) (saying that “[t]he court must direct notice in a reasonable manner 
to all class members who would be bound by the proposal [for settlement]”). 
 128. See id. 23(h)(1) (directing that notice of a motion for a fee award “must be .	.	. 
directed to class members in a reasonable manner”). 
 129. Rule 23(c)(3) says that for (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes the judgment must “include 
and describe those whom the court finds to be class members.” For (b)(3) classes, the 
judgment must “include and specify or describe those to whom the Rule 23(c)(2) notice 
was directed, who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be class 
members.” 
 130. As the Sixth Circuit put it: 
The class the district court initially certified was flawed in that it only included 
those who are “entitled to relief.” This is an improper fail-safe class that shields 
the putative class members from receiving an adverse judgment. Either the class 
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as including all those wishing to engage in certain types of activity. 
Along these lines, the First Circuit found it sufficient to describe a 
class in a suit about police surveillance of a class consisting of all 
persons “who wish to . . . engage, in the City of Fall River, in peaceful 
political discussion . . . without surveillance.”131 But the definition of a 
class dependent on the subjective state of mind of class members 
early was found too problematical.132 More objective criteria are 
needed. 
Objective criteria may sometimes be hard to apply as well, 
however. Recall Daar, the 1967 California Yellow Cab case.133 The 
named plaintiff alleged that Yellow Cab had set its cab meters in Los 
Angeles at a rate higher than authorized and thus overcharged 
passengers over an extended period. In reviewing the trial court’s 
refusal to recognize a class action, the Supreme Court of California 
said that its first job was to determine “whether [the complaint] sets 
forth facts sufficient to show the requisite ascertainable class.”134 The 
problem was that the plaintiff could not point to a method of 
determining who had taken Yellow Cab cabs during the pertinent 
period. The court found this difficulty unimportant: 
Defendant apparently fails to distinguish between the necessity 
of establishing the existence of an ascertainable class and the 
necessity of identifying the individual members of such class as 
a prerequisite to a class suit. . . . The fact that the class members 
are unidentifiable at this point will not preclude a complete 
determination of the issues affecting the class. Presumably an 
accounting in the suit at bench will determine the total amount 
of the alleged overcharges; any judgment will be binding on all 
the users of taxicabs within the prior four years. However, no 
one may recover his separate damages until he comes forward, 
identifies himself and proves the amount thereof.135 
Lately, that “ascertainability” problem has assumed considerable 
importance in consumer deception suits. The Third Circuit has 
 
members win or, by virtue of losing, they are not in the class and, therefore, not 
bound by the judgment. 
Randleman v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 646 F.3d 347, 352 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 131. Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362, 1364 (1st Cir. 1972) (omission in original).  
 132. See, e.g., Simer v. Rios, 661 F.3d 655, 669 (7th Cir. 1981) (refusing to certify a class 
of all those “chilled” from applying for governmental aid by an improper requirement for 
applying). 
 133. See supra notes 103–10 and accompanying text (discussing Daar v. Yellow Cab 
Co.). 
 134. Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 433 P.2d 732, 739 (Cal. 1967) 
 135. Id. at 740. 
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insisted in such a case that, in order to obtain class certification, the 
plaintiff specify an “administratively feasible” method for identifying 
actual consumers who bought the product in question.136 A California 
district judge has reacted that this decision “eviscerates low purchase 
price consumer class actions in the Third Circuit.”137 The Seventh 
Circuit has rejected the “heightened” ascertainability requirement,138 
and other courts seem to have sided more often with the Seventh 
Circuit.139 
It is difficult to detach this debate from the underlying uneasiness 
about the real purposes of the class action device. If it is entirely to 
deter, one could probably design reasonably accurate measures of 
“unjust” profit for the producer of mislabeled consumer products. 
But if the main goal is to compensate those actually misled, that 
solution is incomplete. And some recommended versions of an 
ascertainability “fix” surely seemed to be overbroad. At least one 
proposal was to add an ascertainability requirement to Rule 23(a), 
which applies to all class actions, including injunctive relief class 
actions under Rule 23(b)(2).140 As the Third Circuit has recognized, 
its ascertainability jurisprudence does not apply to such cases.141 
After considerable discussion, the Advisory Committee decided 
not to attempt to resolve the ascertainability debate by rule 
amendment. During the public comment process, some urged that it 
do so while others praised the Committee for desisting.142 The 
Committee has not since taken up the issue. 
C. “No Injury” Classes 
The concept of legally compensable injury is surely a challenging 
one. The gradual recognition of tort claims for infliction of emotional 
 
 136. Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 304 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Marcus v. BMW 
of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 594 (3d Cir. 2012)). 
 137. McCrary v. Elations Co., No. EDCV 13–00242, 2014 WL 1779243, at *8 (C.D. 
Cal., Jan. 13, 2014). 
 138. Mullens v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 139. See, e.g., In re Petrobras Sec., 862 F.3d 250, 265 (2d Cir. 2017); Briseno v. ConAgra 
Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1123 (9th Cir. 2017).  
 140. See, e.g., Letter from Lawyers for Civil Justice, to Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules 
6 (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USC-RULES-CV-2016-0004-
0039 [https://perma.cc/4XZW-Q7EC] (follow attachment) (recommending the addition of 
a new Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(5): “The members of the class are objectively identifiable by 
reliable and feasible means without individual testimony from putative class members and 
without substantial administrative burden”). 
 141. See Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 561 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting that 
ascertainability is not required for certification of a class seeking only injunctive relief). 
 142. See Summary of Comments and Testimony, supra note 100, at 182–84. 
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distress is one illustration. On the other hand, certain kinds of harms 
seem obvious candidates for legal protection. For example, racial 
discrimination is almost surely thought to inflict compensable harm 
whether or not it produces physical or economic harm. 
But there may be claims that seem far from that model, 
particularly in regard to some statutory claims. Consider the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 1991 legislation amended by 
the Junk Fax Prevention Act in 2005.143 Although it would seem that 
the day of junk faxes has passed—who really uses the fax machine 
anymore?—junk fax lawsuits have multiplied. According to the Wall 
Street Journal, only forty-four such suits were filed in 2009, but that 
number rose to 1,136 cases in 2012 and 4,860 in 2016.144 “The dollar 
amounts awarded from the cases can be large, particularly in the 
small percentage of cases certified as class actions.”145 As Judge 
Easterbrook recently noted,146 it is surprising how many junk fax class 
actions there are. 
There may be a viable question whether the harm of receiving a 
junk fax is sufficient to support a suit. There may be some modest 
expense, but it is difficult to regard as comparable to suffering racial 
discrimination. The plaintiff quoted in the Wall Street Journal story 
explained that “[i]t’s super annoying.”147 In a 2016 case defense-side 
lawyers hoped would put an end to such class actions, the Supreme 
Court held that a statutory claim must be based on a “concrete” 
injury, but its decision did not entirely resolve the matter.148 
Meanwhile, the Advisory Committee was urged to revise Rule 23 
to put an end to the “no injury” class action.149 The submission 
directly countered the deterrence argument for class actions on behalf 
of low value claims: “[P]rivate enforcement of regulation tends to 
overdeter legitimate behavior and can hamstring governmental 
attempts to regulate public risks. Unchecked private enforcement can 
also disrupt the balance that regulatory agencies strive to achieve 
 
 143. See Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-21, 119 Stat. 359 (codified 
as amended at 47 U.S.C. §	227 (2016)).  
 144. Sara Randazzo, Taking Unwanted Faxes to Court, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 2017, at 
B4. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 784 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 147. Randazzo, supra note 144, at B4. 
 148. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016). 
 149. See Letter from Lawyers from Civil Justice, to Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules & 
Rule 23 Subcomm. 5 (Mar. 14, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USC-
RULES-CV-2016-0004-0033 [https://perma.cc/GNT5-C96C] (follow attachment).  
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through their own regulation and enforcement.”150 In support, the 
submission relied on a study by Professor Shepherd to show that “no 
injury” class actions during the period from 2005 to 2015 had resulted 
in defendant payouts of some $4 billion, but that only about nine 
percent of that amount actually found its way into the pockets of class 
members.151 
The Shepherd study found that about 20% of the identified class 
actions could be classified as “no injury” because the researchers 
concluded that they exhibited at least one of the following four 
conditions: (1) the plaintiffs suffered no actual or imminent concrete 
harm giving rise to an injury-in-fact; (2) the only harm was a technical 
statutory violation; (3) any economic loss was negligible or 
infinitesimal; or (4) the sought recovery was typically unrelated to 
compensating plaintiffs for economic or other harm.152 One might 
speculate that the level of claiming by class members in such suits 
might be low; in any event, the report concluded that it was in fact 
usually low. 
Plaintiff lawyers, meanwhile, reportedly received over one third 
of the settlement amounts in these “no injury” cases.153 From the 
standpoint of compensation, then, these class actions do not perform. 
“Moreover, although plaintiff compensation is irrelevant to whether 
defendants are deterred from future harmful behavior, achieving 
deterrence through private class actions is exceptionally imprecise 
and inefficient.”154 Actions by public enforcement authorities are 
preferable, Professor Shepherd explained, particularly because 
guaranteed awards and attorney’s fee recoveries in private actions 
encourage “frivolous suits in order to extort settlements.”155 
There are reasons to suspect that private profit-seeking 
enforcement can produce anomalous incentives and outcomes. 
Perhaps some spam fax suits fit that model. And taking a firm stand 
on limiting class actions to compensatory goals might support 
changing Rule 23 to prevent overenforcement. But picking and 
 
 150. Id. at 3 (footnote omitted). 
 151. JOANNA SHEPHERD, AN EMPIRICAL SURVEY OF NO-INJURY CLASS ACTIONS 1–
2 (Emory Univ. Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 16-402, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2726905 [http://perma.cc/8MLQ-Q3EE]. 
 152. Id. at 1. 
 153. “[A]lthough 60 percent of the total award may be available to class members, in 
reality, they typically receive less than 9 percent of the total. In comparison, class counsel 
receives an average of 37.9 percent of available funds, over 4 times the funds distributed to 
the class.” Id. at 2. 
 154. Id. at 4. 
 155. Id. 
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choosing between the “valid” and “frivolous” statutory claims would 
be a curious feature of a procedure rule. And the Advisory 
Committee did not take up this suggestion. 
IV.  THE ACTUAL 2016 PACKAGE 
As Professor Fitzpatrick has observed, the Advisory 
Committee’s actual amendment package is “pretty modest stuff.”156 
The Committee proposed amendments primarily designed to (1) 
require “frontloading” of information regarding proposed class action 
settlements;157 (2) articulate a relatively short list of “core” 
considerations bearing on whether a proposed settlement should be 
approved as “fair, adequate, and reasonable”;158 and (3) curb or 
defeat the efforts of “bad faith objectors” to exploit the settlement 
process for personal gain.159 
At least some were disappointed at the modesty of the 
package.160 In addition, even though the “modest” package did not 
include any of the issues central to the tension between compensation 
and deterrence, the public comment period provided examples of 
people reading positions on these issues into the package. 
Cy pres: The Committee Note regarding the “frontloading” 
provision calls for the parties to present details bearing on the 
proposed settlement up front. Among other things, it observes that 
“because some funds are frequently left unclaimed, it is often 
important for the settlement agreement to address the use of those 
funds.”161 As noted above, there are different visions of cy pres. At a 
pragmatic level, one could regard the invitation to address the 
question of disposition of a residue of settlement funds as tending 
 
 156. Perry Cooper, Solutions Afoot for Curbing Class Action Gadflies, 17 CLASS 
ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA) 699, 700 (quoting Brian Fitzpatrick).  
 157. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Appellate, Bankruptcy, Civil, and Criminal Procedure 212–13 (Aug. 2016) [hereinafter 
Preliminary Draft], https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USC-RULES-CV-2016-
0004-0002 [https://perma.cc/8GAD-BKUE] (follow link to view document) (proposed 
amendment to Rule 23(e)(1)). 
 158. See id. at 213–14. 
 159. See id. at 215–17. There are other features to this package, including extending the 
time for filing a request for appellate review under Rule 23(f) to 45 days in cases in which 
the federal government is a party, id. at 217, and recognizing the wider variety of methods 
of giving notice to class members available in the twenty-first century, a subject examined 
in Section V.C. below, see id. at 211–12. 
 160. See Summary of Comments and Testimony, supra note 100, at 182–91 (recounting 
additional issues brought up by commenters).  
 161. Preliminary Draft, supra note 157, at 222–23. This comment was followed by a 
further observation: “Many courts have found guidance on this subject in §	3.07 of the 
American Law Institute, Principles of Aggregate Litigation.” Id. at 223.  
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toward the “minimalist” view.162 Failure to address this question 
might often burden the case at a later stage. Moreover, addressing it 
in a way that is accessible to class members could support arguments 
that they had in a sense assented to this disposition of unclaimed 
funds. If one regards the funds as the property of the class members, 
that could be important. 
“Claims rate”: As the study by Professor Shepherd163 suggests, 
much attention may focus on the extent to which class members 
actually claim and collect settlement funds. The proposed amendment 
to the settlement approval standards included consideration of “the 
effectiveness of the proposed method of distributing relief to the 
class, including the method of processing class-member claims, if 
required.”164 The proposal also invited attention to “the terms of any 
proposed award of attorney’s fees, including timing of payment.”165 
The Committee Note followed up on those rule provisions. It 
observed that “[i]f the notice to the class calls for submission of claims 
before the court decides whether to approve the proposal under Rule 
23(e)(2), it may be important to provide that the parties will report 
back to the court on actual claims experience.”166 It also observed that 
“[p]rovisions for reporting back to the court about actual claims 
experience, and deferring a portion of the fee award until the claims 
experience is known, may bear on the fairness of the overall proposed 
settlement.”167 
The idea of deferring payment of some of the attorney’s fee 
award corresponds to some suggested ways of dealing with the 
potentially corrupting effect of cy pres arrangements. If the attorney’s 
fee is set as a percentage of the “fund” without regard to whether any 
of the class members actually get the money, that could rob class 
counsel of the incentive to make efforts to get money to the class 
members. Professor Wasserman has suggested that reducing class 
counsel’s attorney’s fees in light of the actual payout to class members 
would be a desirable idea.168 To do so would call into question 
situations where the attorney’s fee award to class counsel exceeded 
the payout to class members. But to do so rigidly might erode the 
 
 162. See supra text accompanying notes 119–24. 
 163. See supra text accompanying notes 151–55. 
 164. Preliminary Draft, supra note 157, at 214 (proposed Rule 23(e)(2)(C)(ii)). 
 165. Id. (proposed Rule 23(e)(2)(C)(iii)). 
 166. Id. at 222. 
 167. Id. at 227. 
 168. See Rhonda Wasserman, Cy Pres in Class Action Settlements, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 
97, 136–40 (2014).  
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value of class actions that produce creative compensation schemes 
like the reduced fare fix in Daar.169 
Despite the caution in the proposals, some who commented 
reported that they feared that these amendments would inadvertently 
adopt the compensatory rationale.170 
“No injury” class: Others took the reference to “claims rate” as 
leading to the conclusion that the rule should make clear that the 
court had to define the class in a way that ensured that every member 
had Article III standing.171 But that does not appear to be a 
 
 169. See supra text accompanying notes 103–110. 
 170. See, e.g., Letter from Julie Braman Kane, President, Am. Ass’n for Justice, to 
Rebecca A Womeldorf, Sec’y, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 4–7 (Feb. 14, 
2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USC-RULES-CV-2016-0004-0066 
[https://perma.cc/B3NL-YQ75] (follow attachment) (warning that the reference to “claims 
rate” and the suggestion of deferring fee awards could be misconstrued to have broad 
application); Letter from DRI, to Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules 5–6 (Feb. 7, 2017), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USC-RULES-CV-2016-0004-0072 [https://perma.cc
/NSM4-BVFL] (follow attachment) (stating that claims rate is not an appropriate 
consideration when considering the fairness of a settlement because what matters is the 
relief offered, not how many class members claim that relief); Letter from Scott L. Nelson 
& Allison M. Zieve, Pub. Citizen Litig. Grp., to Advisory Comm. on Rules of Civil 
Procedure 3 (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USC-RULES-CV-
2016-0004-0081 [https://perma.cc/X9YS-FH9Y] (follow attachment) (urging that the 
criterion about distribution of relief should be clarified to make clear that no absolute rule 
requiring complete distribution is mandated); Thomas Sobol, Public Hearing on Proposed 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15–16 (Jan. 4, 2017), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2017-01-04-transcript_of_civil_rules_hearing_in
_phoenix_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZA2A-AHYB] (saying that there is a risk that the 
amendment referring to claims rate would be interpreted to say that, for all cases, there is 
an absolute standard of distribution effectiveness, and that the court should reject any 
proposal that does not satisfy that absolute standard); Letter from Hassan A. Zavareei, 
Tycko & Zavareei LLP, & Gary E. Mason, Whitfield Bryson & Mason LLP, to Comm. on 
Rules of Practice and Procedure 1–2 (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov
/document?D=USC-RULES-CV-2016-0004-0065 [https://perma.cc/X2HG-RMH7] (follow 
attachment) (urging that the amendment and Note improperly overemphasize claims rates 
and are not consistent with current law because they make claims rate the most important 
factor in determining fees). 
 171. See, e.g., Memorandum from Yvonne McKinsey & Anthony Vale, Pepper 
Hamilton LLP, to Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 2–4 (Feb. 15, 2017), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USC-RULES-CV-2016-0004-0069 [https://perma.cc
/8QSA-GHQ9] (follow attachment). This comment agrees that “the relief that the 
settlement is expected to provide to class members is a central concern.” Id. at 2. But it 
asserts that the rule does not go far enough and fails to address directly a concern that has 
come to the fore in consumer class actions, which are brought based on technical 
violations of a law but without any real injury. Id. at 2–4. The commenters argue the rule 
should be clarified to make it clear that the class definition limits membership to those 
with Article III standing. Id. at 3–4. They state that one way to do that would be to amend 
Rule 23(a)(3) on typicality to insist that all members of the class have an injury similar to 
that alleged by the proposed class representative. Id. at 4.  
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constitutional requirement,172 and the amendment package does not 
require it by rule either. 
V.  OTHER POTENTIAL SOURCES OF REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE 
The sensitivity of observers about dramatic changes resulting 
from the current amendment package suggests considering the 
potential of other actors to effect revolutionary change. 
A. The Supreme Court 
As Professors Burbank and Farhang show in their recent book, 
the Supreme Court has recently curtailed private enforcement in 
federal court.173 Whether this is a revolutionary development could be 
debated, but it is clear that the quantity of its class action decisions 
has recently been considerable. By way of contrast: “Between 1980 
and 1997, the Supreme Court issued only two decisions with lasting 
importance for class action doctrine.”174 But in the last decade the 
Court has issued multiple decisions, some of which have had 
important implications.175 To some extent, it may be that the 
practicing bar’s treatment of these decisions partakes of what I have 
called “Comcast Bombast.”176 But surely some of these decisions have 
had a major impact on class action practice.177 
In a way, one could find in the Court’s decisions some features 
that resemble features of the Advisory Committee’s amendment 
 
 172. See Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 362 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding 
that there is no constitutional requirement that all class members satisfy Article III so long 
as at least one class representative does satisfy it). 
 173. See STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: 
THE COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION 130–81 (2017) (discussing 
procedural “retrenchment” by Supreme Court decision). 
 174. D. Marcus, supra note 5, at 644. 
 175. For discussion, see Robert Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 729, 745–823 (2013). 
 176. The reference is to Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013). See also 
Marcus, supra note 16, at 512–16 (describing seeming overstatements about the 
significance of some Supreme Court decisions).  
 177. Primary among those decisions are rulings that enable businesses to insert 
arbitration clauses into their contracts with customers and forbid class action litigation as 
well. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309–10 (2013) 
(enforcing class action waiver in the face of arguments that only a class action would allow 
any litigation due to the expense of proving the statutory claim); AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011) (upholding applicability of class action waiver in 
arbitration provision in contract for cell phone service); cf. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. 
Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2071 (2013) (holding that an arbitrator’s decision to allow class 
arbitration cannot be overturned if it was based on the arbitrator’s interpretation of the 
parties contract).  
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package. The package includes a “frontloading” provision with regard 
to judicial review of proposed settlements,178 and Professor Freer has 
said that “there is a clear trend toward ‘front-loading’ class litigation” 
in the Court’s decisions.179 But it can hardly be said that the 
rulemaking process has responded strongly to the Court’s decisions, 
unless one counts its decision not to proceed with a possible rule 
provision on settlement classes after the Court’s decision in Amchem 
Products, Inc. v. Windsor.180 
Characterizing the Court’s class action jurisprudence can be a bit 
challenging. Professor Mullenix, at least, asserted that during the 
thirty years Justice Scalia (not a great fan of class actions) served on 
the Court, “well more than half of [the Court’s class action] decisions 
are fairly characterized as favoring plaintiffs’ interests in class 
litigation. If anything, the Court has been more pro-plaintiff in its 
class action jurisprudence than pro-business.”181 
Dire warnings, however, often attend the Court’s consideration 
of class action issues. The Court’s 2015 term, for example, was 
characterized as presenting “existential threats to the class action 
device.”182 A year later, however, Professor Issacharoff characterized 
the 2015 term as “the term that wasn’t.”183 The same lawyer who had 
a year before foreseen “existential threat[s]” to the class action 
concluded after the term was finished that “the era where the 
Supreme Court is interested in radically curbing the class action 
device is over.”184 Similarly, Dean Chemerinsky said of that term that 
“the biggest news for class actions was what didn’t happen.”185 
 
 178. See supra text accompanying note 157. 
 179. Richard D. Freer, Front-Loading, Avoidance, and Other Features of the Recent 
Supreme Court Class Action Jurisprudence, 48 AKRON L. REV. 721, 723 (2015). 
 180. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). For discussion of the 1996–1998 amendment episode with 
regard to proposed Rule 23(b)(4) on “settlement class certification” see supra text 
accompanying notes 79–90.  
 181. Linda Mullenix, False Narratives: Justice Scalia’s Impact on Class Action 
Litigation, 17 CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA) 568, 568 (2016). 
 182. Perry Cooper & Kimberly Robinson, Class Action War Heads to SCOTUS, 16 
CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA) 1041, 1041 (2015) (quoting Deepak Gupta). 
 183. Perry Cooper, Class Actions at SCOTUS: The Term that Wasn’t, 17 CLASS 
ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA) 751, 751 (2016) (quoting Samuel Issacharoff). 
 184. Id. (quoting Deepak Gupta). 
 185. Erwin Chemerinsky, A Class Action Shift, TRIAL, Sept. 2016, at 54. He added: 
“The Court did not impose additional restrictions. More generally, Justice Antonin 
Scalia’s death likely means that there is no longer a majority on the Court to limit class 
actions.” Id.; see also Perry Cooper, Supreme Court Scorecard: Not the Class Action Rout 
Defendants Had Hoped For?, 17 CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA) 560, 560–61 (2016) 
(presenting chart showing plaintiffs as “winners” in more cases than defendants). 
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B. Action by Congress 
Congress can fuel class action filings by enacting penalty statutes 
with private enforcement provisions. Congress can also enact class 
action limitations. In 2005, it passed CAFA, which opened federal 
courts to a larger swath of state law class actions.186 Specifics in the 
bill dealt with such particular matters as “coupon settlements.”187 
Much as the legislative debate was heated, CAFA was not a 
revolutionary bill, though it has some consequential provisions. 
The current Congress, however, has taken up possible legislation 
that might have a significant impact on class actions—the Fairness in 
Class Action Litigation Act of 2017.188 One could say that several 
provisions of the bill represent a strong endorsement of the 
“compensation” purpose for class actions, and a corresponding 
rejection of the “deterrence” justification for these lawsuits. That is 
not a criticism of the legislation but instead recognizes that Congress 
might grasp the nettle in a way that the Advisory Committee has not 
done.189 The stated purpose of the legislation is to “diminish abuses in 
class action . . . that are undermining the integrity of the U.S. legal 
system.”190 
Moreover, the pending legislation has several features that 
correspond with topics that have arisen during the Advisory 
Committee’s recent class action work. Thus, it contains a provision 
that seemingly addresses one aspect of the cy pres question, 
commanding that “[i]n no event shall the attorneys’ fee award exceed 
the total amount of money directly distributed to and received by all 
class members.”191 The bill additionally contains a provision that 
seems directly addressed to the ascertainability question.192 It also 
contains a requirement that seems addressed to the “no injury” 
 
 186. For analysis, see Richard L. Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Stated Jurisdictional 
Policy, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1788–1808 (2008). 
 187. See 28 U.S.C. §	1712 (2012). 
 188. H.R. 985, 115th Cong. (2017) (as passed by House, Mar. 9, 2017).  
 189. See Part I. 
 190. H.R. 985 §	102. 
 191. Id. §	103 (proposing new 28 U.S.C. §	1718(b)(2)).  
 192. See id. (adding a new 28 U.S.C. §	1718(a), providing as follows: “A Federal court 
shall not issue an order granting certification of a class action seeking monetary relief 
unless the class is defined with reference to objective criteria and the party seeking to 
maintain such a class action affirmatively demonstrates that there is a reliable and 
administratively feasible mechanism (a) for the court to determine whether putative class 
members fall within the class definition and (b) for distributing directly to a substantial 
majority of class members any monetary relief secured for the class.”). 
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question.193 Indeed, a somewhat similar proposal was made to the 
Advisory Committee.194 Additional provisions of the bill require that 
any attorney’s fees awarded to class counsel not be paid until 
distribution to the class of monetary recoveries.195 
It is uncertain whether this proposed legislation will ultimately 
be adopted.196 If it is enacted, there will likely be a need for the courts 
to interpret its requirements. But it is also likely that many would 
describe some features of it as revolutionary, not evolutionary. 
C. Technology 
Tech gurus routinely tell everyone else that they are going to 
“disrupt” everything with their Digital Revolution. Lawyers are not 
immune. It seems that digital technology has had a greater effect on 
 
 193. See id. (adding a new 28 U.S.C. §	1716(a) that would provide: “A Federal court 
shall not issue an order granting certification of a class action seeking monetary relief for 
personal injury or economic loss unless the party seeking to maintain such a class action 
affirmatively demonstrates that each proposed class member suffered the same type and 
scope of injury as the named class representative or representatives.”). This provision 
seems out of step with the rulings of courts. See, e.g., In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 
F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 2015). 
 194. See Lawyers for Civil Justice, supra note 140, at 4 (proposing that Rule 23(a)(3) be 
amended as follows: “the claims, or defenses, and type and scope of injury of the 
representative parties are typical of the claims, or defenses, and type and scope of injury of 
the class”).  
 195. H.R. 985 §	103 (proposing new 28 U.S.C. §	1718(b)(1)). The bill also contains a 
provision dealing with issues classes, something the Advisory Committee considered but 
did not include in its amendment package. Thus, H.R. 985 would add a new 28 U.S.C. 
§	1720(a) providing: 
A Federal court shall not issue an order granting certification of a class action with 
respect to particular issues pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure unless the entirety of the cause of action from which the particular 
issues arise satisfies all the class certification prerequisites of Rule 23(a) and Rule 
23(b)(1), Rule 23(b)(2), or Rule 23(b)(3). 
Id. 
 196. Interestingly, a group of conservative Republican representatives called the 
House Liberty Caucus issued a statement on March 9, 2017, the date the House passed the 
bill, strongly opposing it, partly on the ground that class actions are preferable to direct 
government regulation: 
Class action lawsuits are a market-based solution for addressing widespread 
breaches of contract, violations of property rights, and infringements of other legal 
rights. They are a preferable alternative to government regulation because they 
impose damages only on bad actors rather than imposing compliance costs on 
entire industries. 
Press Release, House Liberty Caucus, House Liberty Caucus Statement on H.R. 985, 
Fairness in Class Action Litig. Act of 2017 (Mar. 9, 2017) https://static1.squarespace.com
/static/559b2478e4b05d22b1e75b2d/t/58c3277d86e6c02103c56eec/1489184638338/3-9-17+HLC
+statement+on+HR+985+-+FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FBX-8UFA]. 
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doctors than on lawyers,197 and I have argued that the effect of 
communications breakthroughs on the legal profession has been more 
evolutionary than revolutionary.198 
At the same time, it is hard to deny that technology has affected 
litigation in important ways. For one thing, it has made vastly more 
information potentially available through discovery, leading to 
amendments in 2006 to the rules.199 Amidst these discovery 
challenges, there may be good news for class actions. As Elizabeth 
Cabraser has recently said, electronic communications provide the 
prospect of a “complete revolution in the relationships between 
members of the class, their counsel and the court.”200 Although class 
counsel formerly would communicate with class members only once 
or twice over the life cycle of a class action, “[w]e are in a completely 
different situation today and that process has accelerated so quickly 
that many of us don’t fully even realize yet where we are.”201 This is of 
particular relevance to the current amendment package, which 
focuses on management of proposed class action settlements. 
According to Professor Issacharoff: “By the time you get to the class 
settlement, the old image that we have that these are anonymous, 
non-participating individuals, gives way to a very active block of 
participation.”202 
There is an interesting parallel in reactions to the current Rule 23 
amendment package. One feature of the package is an effort to take 
account of this transformation of communications technology as it 
relates to class action notice. In 1974, the Supreme Court seemed to 
say that the rule required individual notice of class certification in a 
Rule 23(b)(3) class action to be by first class mail.203 That was the 
ordinary way of communicating about a wide variety of topics forty 
 
 197. See Richard L. Marcus, The Electronic Lawyer, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 263, 265–73 
(2009) (contrasting effect of technology on medical practice and legal practice). 
 198. See Richard Marcus, The Impact of Computers on the Legal Profession: Evolution 
or Revolution?, 102 NW. L. REV. 1827, 1829 (2008). For a more recent report, see Steve 
Lohr, I, Robot, Esq? Not Just Yet, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2017, at B1 (reporting that even 
recent artificial intelligence breakthroughs have not replaced the individual one-on-one 
tasks of many lawyers). 
 199. For discussion, see Richard Marcus, Only Yesterday: Reflections on Rulemaking 
Responses to E-Discovery, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 7–19 (2004). 
 200. Perry Cooper, Points for Participation: Class Members Increasingly Active, 18 
CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA) 89, 89 (2017) (quoting Cabraser). 
 201. Id. (quoting Cabraser). The story notes that Cabraser reportedly makes a point of 
personally responding to every email from a class member in the VW case in which she is 
lead plaintiffs’ counsel. Id. 
 202. Id. (quoting Issacharoff). 
 203. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173–75 (1974). 
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years ago. But that has changed. Consider, for example, a recent 
Ninth Circuit case: 
Initial e-mail notice of the settlement was provided to some 35 
million class members. Notice was mailed to more than 9 
million class members whose email addresses were invalid such 
that the email notice “bounced back.” . . . . The notice 
encouraged class members to visit the class website for more 
details. In response to the notice, 1,183,444 claims were 
submitted.204 
The Ninth Circuit case was not an anomaly; use of more 
“modern” methods of giving notice to class members has grown in 
recent years. So the current amendment package recognized this 
change in society by stating with regard to notice of certification in 
(b)(3) class actions that “[t]he notice may be by United States mail, 
electronic means, or other appropriate means.”205 The accompanying 
Committee Note attempted to explore and evaluate the concerns that 
would bear on using one or another form of notice.206 
Somewhat surprisingly, this proposal generated at least as much 
controversy as any other piece of the package. Several very 
prominent and well-respected notice professionals vehemently 
denounced the proposed change as fostering a “race to the bottom” in 
which inexperienced bottom feeder vendors would win out over 
reputable providers by offering to provide effective notice at rock-
bottom rates.207 Others commented that they supported the 
amendment because it recognized current realities.208 Despite these 
adverse comments, the Rule 23 Subcommittee resolved after the 
public comment period to adhere to its proposal, though with a 
change to recognize that more than one method of giving notice 
might be suitable in a given case.209 
It may be that electronic communications could affect class 
action practice more broadly, and even supplant it to some extent. 
 
 204. In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., 779 F.3d 934, 941 (9th Cir. 2015).  
 205. Preliminary Draft, supra note 157, at 211–12.  
 206. Id. at 218–20. 
 207. See Summary of Comments and Testimony, supra note 100, at 134–44 
(summarizing testimony and comments on this amendment proposal). 
 208. See id.; see also Alexander Aiken, Comment, Class Action Notice in the Digital 
Age, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 971–72 (2017) (endorsing proposed amendment regarding 
manner of giving notice). 
 209. See Rule 23 Subcommittee Report, in AGENDA BOOK OF THE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, supra note 100, at 103, 105 (reporting a proposal to change 
the amendment to say: “The notice may be by one or more of the following: United States 
mail, electronic means, or other appropriate means.”).  
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One alternative is something like the “mass action” that CAFA 
classified as a class action for purposes of its jurisdictional 
provisions.210 Such collaborative litigation may be fostered by 
contemporary communication methods. Recall that European 
customers of VW reportedly have complained that American 
purchasers are getting a better deal through class action 
settlements.211 As the New York Times has reported, “[l]awyers in 
Berlin, Paris and elsewhere in Europe are teaming up with new online 
services to recruit clients en masse to try to get around the usual 
restrictions on consumer lawsuits.”212 This new form of litigation is 
possible because “the internet has made it possible to recruit huge 
numbers of consumers who have similar gripes.”213 Professor Coffee 
has reported on somewhat similar high-tech efforts to recruit groups 
of plaintiffs to sue VW for securities fraud.214 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, revolutionary change to class action practice is not 
currently emerging from the rules process. Some have urged the 
Advisory Committee to move more aggressively, both to insist that 
the device be limited purely to compensatory purposes and to fortify 
the deterrence rationale. Instead, the current package does not 
include rule provisions directly addressing such issues as cy pres, 
ascertainability, and the “no injury” class action. It may be, as 
Professor Bone has recently written, that a complete resolution of 
those sorts of issues depends on developing “a normative theory of 
adjudicatory legitimacy.”215 But just as the original framers of the 
modern class action chose to “muddle through without picking sides” 
in the debate on the “true” purpose of class actions,216 the current 
rulemakers have not rushed to resolve those debates. Indeed, as 
things now stand, it seems that the entity most likely to take a firm 
position is Congress, which has pending legislation that seems 
 
 210. See 28 U.S.C. §	1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (2012) (describing a “mass action” as any action 
“in which the monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried 
jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law or fact”). 
As a possible example, see Burr & Forman v. Blair, 470 F.3d 1019, 1023 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(suit on behalf of 3,000 plaintiffs for toxic contamination).  
 211. See supra text accompanying note 56. 
 212. Ewing, supra note 55, at B1.  
 213. Id. 
 214. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Globalization of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Law, 
Culture and Incentives, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1895, 1908–11 (2017). 
 215. See Robert G. Bone, Justifying Class Action Limits: Parsing the Debate Over 
Ascertainability and Cy Pres, 65 KAN. L. REV. 913, 954 (2017). 
 216. See D. Marcus, supra note 5, at 597. 
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forcefully to embrace the compensation rationale.217 Besides that, the 
most likely source of revolutionary change for class action practice 
may not be legal change, but technological innovation.218 
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